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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 18/05/2006

Accident number: 260

Accident time: 08:15

Accident Date: 25/08/1999

Where it occurred: Plowshare Minefield,
Cordon Sanitaire

Country: Zimbabwe

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: KMS

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: M969 AP blast

Ground condition: woodland (bush)

Date record created: 18/02/2004

Date last modified: 18/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
inadequate medical provision (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
disciplinary action against victim (?)
inadequate training (?)
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Accident report
At the time of this accident the demining company operated in two-man teams using a oneman drill. One deminer looked for tripwires, cut undergrowth, used the detector and
excavated finds while the other watched from a safe distance and "controlled" him. The group
issued frontal protection and their drills assumed that the deminer would kneel or squat while
excavating.
An internal Accident report was made available by the demining group in December 1999.
The following summarises its content.
The victim was cutting an exploratory lane "to identify the direction of the Plough share
mines". This appears to have been done by identifying a picket (post on which the plough
share mines were originally placed) and working towards the next. The victim missed the next
picket and returned to a place 30 metres from the last picket. "This is the normal drill to be
used when row direction is lost". The victim did not use the correct marking and clearance
procedures. He was investigating a detector reading at 08:15 when the accident occurred.
The victim suffered severe facial injuries and lacerations to his right hand. He was treated by
a paramedic and then taken to hospital. The Site Supervisor was confused over which
hospital the victim was taken to and called the Medevac route "unclear" [from which I infer
that the route to be taken was not clear in advance]. At 08:55 the Site Supervisor was told
that the victim was "at hospital receiving treatment".
The investigators found detector readings in the lane leading to the accident site. No lane
markings for the last five metres were evident and the vegetation had not been cut. The
victim's mine detector was found to be operating properly. His visor was on the site and had
been smeared with blood, but there was no sign of any blast damage to it. From this the
investigators inferred that it was not worn at the time of the accident.
They found no sign of excavation around the blast crater. They also found no sign of the
victim's prodder and trowel, [and so did not determine which was in use at the time].
They found no evidence of the mine but decided it was "more than likely" an M969 or a VS50.

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the victim was working incorrectly in numerous ways and
used incorrect "prodding/excavation" methods. They felt that "complacency had set in". They
found that the immediate treatment and Medevac of the victim was "adequate" (although the
route was unclear) and stated that radio communications worked well.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended retraining stressing the problems of working in a "patterned
minefield and complacency". Supervisors were to give refresher training to Team Leaders,
who (if satisfactory) would pass on the training to deminers. A general personnel
reassessment was scheduled [partly as the result of a second severe injury occurring on the
same day]. They further recommended that the Medevac route "be reviewed immediately"
and the victim and his partner should be dismissed for "gross negligence of SOPs".

Victim Report
Victim number: 334

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 7 hours 45 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron
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Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Eyes
severe Face
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Finger
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
An internal "Medical report" was made available in December 1999. This stated that the victim
reached the field medical unit by 08:30 where he was stabilised and then evacuated to St
Albert's hospital. He was treated and stabilised there again before being moved to Karanda
hospital [where the Site supervisor thought he was going directly] at 12:30, arriving at around
16:00 hours. On arrival he was treated in the "casualty theatre". He had "reconstructive
surgery to left eye" and "right eye surgery". The following day the victim was transferred to a
specialist eye unit in the capital city.
The victim's injuries were described as "bilateral penetrating eye injuries, multiple second
degree facial burns, traumatic amputation of distal left index finger". The prognosis was that
the victim would "probably" retain 70% vision in his left eye, while having 0-10% in his right.
The report included an explanation of the deviation from the usual medevac route – saying
that immediate examination of the eye in a sterile environment was thought necessary, so the
route was changed.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim
was in breach of several basic safety rules and his errors were not corrected. Peer control by
partners is known to be ineffective and the management's decision to dismiss the victim and
his partner while not punishing the Team Leader seems strange. The Team Leader was
retrained along with all other personnel, and it seems likely that the victim's partner could
have benefited from that as well. Because retraining was accepted as necessary, the
secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”.
The management of this demining group's willingness to admit its own failings and attempts
to address them was unusual, and refreshing. Their open attitude to "mine-hunting", which is
common but usually denied at senior level, is noteworthy.
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